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ABSTRACT
‘Place-based explanations’ of politics in the U.K. tell sweeping
narratives about ‘Two Englands’, or of sizeable regions of the
country that have been ‘Left Behind’, reinforcing popular accounts
of a North–South or city-town divide. We introduce the concept of
nested deprivation – deprivation that may occur in just one
housing estate or even one row of flats within neighbourhoods
that are otherwise affluent. We report on intensive fieldwork in 8
neighbourhoods varying in relative affluence and density of
population (including urban, suburban/satellite, market town or
rural village). Three key themes and consequences emerge for
those living in nested deprivation in relatively affluent and
geographically dispersed contexts: (a) either disconnection from
or entrapment within the local economy; (b) social isolation and
atomisation; and (c) powerlessness to affect politics. ‘Place-based’
explanations of rapid and radical changes to political participation
in Britain need to take fine-grained geographical distinctions
much more seriously. Our study provides evidence that the rising
tides in affluent areas are drowning some residents rather than
lifting all boats. Where deprivation is dispersed and then nested
within mostly affluent constituencies it does not allow for the
political mobilisation among communities of interest that is a





The escalating inequality associated with globalisation and advanced capitalism is seen to
be at the root of recent ‘earthquakes’ in the political landscape. Rising social and economic
inequality has fed a sense of alienation from political and economic elites. Internationally,
inequality and alienation is linked to the rise of populism across Western Europe and to
Donald Trump’s electoral successes in the Rust Belt. In Britain, it is linked variously to the
rise of UKIP as an electoral force, to the transformation of the Labour Party under the lea-
dership of Jeremy Corbyn, and most dramatically of all to the success of the Leave cam-
paign in 2016’s Brexit Referendum with the subsequent rise of the Brexit Party and the
result of the 2019 general election. As such, seeking to explain the impact of inequality
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on patterns of political participation in these contexts has become the chief concern in
contemporary political science and public punditry. The debate is currently dominated
by competing diagnoses of the causal dynamics underpinning these shifts, and the
meaning of their political consequences. One side emphasises the effects of economic stag-
nation, and interprets the newfound volatility in participation primarily as a manifestation
of deeply held resentment towards political and economic elites. The other side empha-
sises social or cultural insecurity, and interprets the desire to ‘take back control’ primarily
as an assertion of identity and belonging. What both sides share in common is an empha-
sis on place. The consequences of rising inequality are assumed to be concentrated geo-
graphically in ‘marginalised communities’ – communities that have been losers rather
than winners in the free market economies of advanced capitalist societies. In Britain,
the focus is on shifting patterns of public opinion and political behaviour in smaller
towns in the North and Eastern coastal regions especially. These ‘place-based expla-
nations’ draw on survey data to tell sweeping narratives about ‘Two Englands’, or of size-
able regions of the country that have been ‘Left Behind’, places that were red and are now
blue (or vice versa), reinforcing popular accounts of a North–South or city-town divide.
These accounts offer important insights into fast-moving developments, shining a
penetrating light on the social and political effects of pervasive and rapidly escalating
inequality. In Britain, they reveal, and reinforce, a changing wisdom about electoral battle-
grounds. But they are a problem because they are too simple. They lack nuance, especially
when their influence spreads beyond the realm of strategic discussion of electoral cam-
paigning and into prevailing narratives about British politics, policymaking and partici-
pation more broadly. A 20-minute drive from almost any point on the map, or a
cursory glance at ONS census data, reveals that the U.K. cannot be so neatly divided geo-
graphically into economic haves and have-nots.
As 2017s Grenfell disaster demonstrated tragically, there are pockets of deprivation in
even the most apparently affluent areas, and this deprivation bears consequence on how
we live and die. This is a form of what we call nested deprivation – deprivation that
may occur in just one housing estate or even one row of flats within neighbourhoods
that are otherwise non-deprived, and potentially very affluent – a situation common to
almost anywhere designated a ‘winner’ in broad macro accounts of contemporary
British politics.
Nested deprivation is inequality that is widely dispersed. It is a salient feature of Brit-
ain’s geography and economy. Although ONS data allows us to discern patterns in the
geography of multiple deprivation in the U.K., it also highlights ‘pockets of deprivation
surrounded by less deprived places in every region of England’ (MHLG, 2019, p. 5).
Nested deprivation as a phenomenon is spread geographically across the country, but it
tends to occur with greater frequency and intensity in regions that are overall more pros-
perous, such as the South of England. There is also a good reason to think nested depri-
vation manifests and is experienced differently to concentrated deprivation in other parts
of the country. Inequality in contexts of nested deprivation is acute and immediate. For
individuals living in nested deprivation, economic, social and political inequality is in-
your-face, not through the television set.
However, outside of one-off catastrophes like Grenfell, the presence of nested depri-
vation and its consequences have received little attention in political research or in the
popular imagination. People living in nested deprivation are not so much the ‘Left
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Behind’ as the ‘Never Acknowledged’ . Acknowledging and seeking to understand this sort
of inequality is important not just because it adds nuance to sweeping geographical
accounts of British politics, but because it provides a different setting through which to
disentangle causal claims about the effects of inequality and consequences for political par-
ticipation and representation.
In this paper, we fill this gap by looking at the lived experience of nested deprivation
within the South of England, a region in stark contrast to the ‘marginalised communities’
imagined in place-based explanations of changing political participation. In fact, counties
like Hampshire and Dorset are presented as archetypal ‘winners’ in the social and political
chasm caused by widening inequality in Britain. Aggregate statistics present the South of
England as an area of high employment, with rising house prices close to London benefit-
ing the South’s relatively high proportion of homeowners. But aggregate statistics hide
individual experience. What is it like to live under economic strain when most people
nearby, either in neighbouring towns and suburbs or even those living next-door and
on the same street, are relatively affluent? What does this visceral, in-your-face inequality
mean for an individual’s sense of social identity and belonging, their perception of the
local economy, and ultimately their political views and behaviour?
The census and survey research underpinning existing place-based explanations is too
blunt a tool to answer these questions effectively. It cannot drill down to the local neigh-
bourhood level where nested deprivation presents most acutely, nor reliably pick up on a
geographically dispersed and notoriously ‘hard to reach’ demographic. New survey meth-
odologies have shown that individual’s perceptions of their community vary widely but
focus on the spaces where we meet people with whom we are interdependent, and that
government statistics cannot always reveal the nuances in the lived experiences of these
places and spaces (e.g. Wong, Bowers, Rubenson, Fredrickson, & Rundlett, 2020). In
this paper, then, we join a swelling group of qualitative researchers aiming to add rich
colour and context to broad narratives about the causes and consequences of inequality
in British politics (see Bromley-Davenport et al., 2018; Hopkins, 2019; Killick, 2018;
Mckenzie, 2017). We draw on qualitative data from a recent project supported by the
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Boswell et al., 2018). The project involved intensive
fieldwork in 8 neighbourhoods across Dorset, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight that
varied in terms of both their relative affluence and their density of population (including
urban, suburban/satellite, market town or rural village). The ‘boots on the ground’
approach to fieldwork allows us to effectively target the Never Acknowledged living in
nested deprivation on the South Coast, and to explore and report their authentic views
and experiences. The variation in fieldwork settings allows us to capture a fuller range
of contexts in which nested deprivation presents within the region, and to make more
robust claims about the relative experience and consequences of deprivation in contexts
of greater affluence and geographical dispersion.
As one might expect, the findings from this sort of research are richly nuanced, but for
the sake of clarity we highlight the three key consequences that emerge for those living in
nested deprivation in relatively affluent and geographically dispersed contexts:
(a) a sense of disconnection from or entrapment within the local economy;
(b) a sense of social isolation and atomisation; and
(c) a sense of powerlessness to affect politics.
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As such, we conclude that ‘place-based’ explanations of rapid and radical changes to
political participation in Britain need to take fine-grained geographical distinctions
much more seriously.
The argument and analysis proceed as follows. The first section reviews place-based
explanations of changing political participation in more depth. The aim is to situate
these explanations within a more established scholarship on the ‘geography of opportu-
nity’, and highlight the gap in the high-profile debate with regard to the widespread
phenomenon of nested deprivation. The second section outlines the method, including
a justification of our comparative case selection and a detailed account of our approach
to data collection and analysis. The third section analyses the data according to the
social, economic and political dimensions of nested deprivation. The conclusion draws
together the main implications of these findings for place-based scholarship in British pol-
itical science and for political advocacy and policy work targeted at addressing the causes
and consequences of inequality.
Interrogating Place-based Explanations of Changing Political Participation
in the U.K.
Political geography, long a peripheral interest in studies of public opinion and voter
turnout, has become perhaps the central concern in contemporary politics scholarship.
Scholars are turning to place to disentangle the sudden and unexpected changes underpin-
ning anti-political sentiment and electoral volatility in established western democracies
(see e.g. Cramer, 2016 and Norris & Inglehart 2018 on the U.S.; Treib, 2014 and
Hobolt, 2016 on Western Europe; and Ford & Goodwin, 2014 and Jennings & Stoker,
2016 on the U.K.). It is a scramble to make sense of the new electoral maps emerging
in this era of uncertainty and change.
In the context of the U.K., and England especially, emerging scholarship finds clear dis-
crepancies in attitudes towards trade, immigration and progressive social issues between
the affluent South (concentrated especially in London and university towns) and ‘margin-
alised communities’ in the post-industrial North and Eastern coast. The nature and
meaning of this discrepancy is a subject of considerable public debate and contested aca-
demic emphasis – one side focuses more on economic insecurity, the other side on a form
of social or cultural displacement – with consequences both for how we understand the
shifting plates of electoral politics in Britain and for how the political system and political
parties within it ought to respond.
Wemap out the debate and place it against long-standing scholarship on the ‘neighbour-
hood effects’ of inequality on how individuals perceive their economic and social context
and what this means for their political participation. Our emphasis, befitting our interpre-
tive approach (as outlined below) is not so much on distal and abstracted accounts of com-
munity associated with place, but a more subjective account which accords with the way
people living in a context of nested deprivation see and define community themselves.
Our aim is two-fold. One is to reveal relevant complications in the pervasive narrative
underpinning divergent views of Britain’s new political geography. While imagining a
neat geographical divide into economic or cultural haves and have-nots may serve well as
a blunt heuristic for media pundits and electoral campaign strategists, it does not come
close to capturing the nuances of political attitudes and behaviours in practice, especially
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across areas of nested deprivation. The second is to drawondecades of scholarship about the
geography of inequality largely missing from recent provocative commentary, in order to
develop a more grounded conceptual account of the economic, social and political
factors associated with the domestic effects of advanced capitalism and globalisation.
First, however, a caveat. We are aware that framing the debate in terms of ‘economic
marginalisation’ versus ‘social marginalisation’ risks downplaying the nuances and
degree of overlap between these perspectives and analyses in recent academic work.
However, we hold to this framing for three key reasons. One is that, although there is
increasing recognition of overlap and accommodation between these perspectives in
recent academic writing (see e.g. Jennings & Stoker, 2019), we maintain that it serves as
a useful device to summarise and highlight the different emphases in the causal expla-
nations underpinning diverging political attitudes. Two is that the broad distinction
remains strong in public debate and political rhetoric. Indeed, prevailing narratives
around the Left behind and Two Englands offered important discursive resources partici-
pants could draw on in discussion in interviews and focus groups. Narratives of geo-
graphic political divides have continued to dominate analysis and policy in the wake of
the U.K.’s 2019 election. Three, and most important, is that laying these prevailing narra-
tives side-by-side helps reveal a common blindspot. It illustrates clearly that prominent
scholarship in this high-profile area despite its various lenses has neglected to consider
the potentially complicating effects of nested deprivation that we describe here.
Economic Marginalisation
One version of the ‘marginalised communities’ narrative, associated most closely with Jen-
nings and Stoker’s (2016) account of ‘two Englands’, places strong emphasis on economic
stagnation (see also Flinders, 2018; Jennings & Lodge, 2018).1 The narrative is one which
imagines England (and by extension Britain) to be divided into thriving cosmopolitan
areas and post-industrial cities and towns in decline. At the root of the problem lie
decades of market liberalisation and increased global trade, which have been experienced
unevenly across the U.K. Specifically, the claim is that the economic benefits have been
disproportionately concentrated in some areas (especially London), while the costs have
been borne disproportionately by others (especially in the post-industrial North and
Wales as well as seaside towns, especially on the East coast). These economically margin-
alised communities have thus become stagnant ‘backwaters’. The alienation that residents
feel towards business and political elites, and their cosmopolitan values, is seen as primar-
ily a product of these economic circumstances (see McKay, 2019). And so the remedy,
underpinned by the narrative of economic stagnation, entails redistributing wealth and
opportunities afforded by the macro successes of market liberalisation to ‘backwater’ areas.
The idea at the core of this narrative; that ‘place matters’ or that there are ‘neighbour-
hood effects’ on the economic potential and capacity of individuals is closely tied to the
concept of ‘geography of opportunity’ which ‘suggests that where individuals live affects
their opportunities and life outcomes’ (Rosenbaum, 1995, p. 231). There is a consensus
in this scholarship that these area effects might manifest through supply of neighbourhood
resources such as local services and access to jobs; model learning from social ties and
social networks; socialisation and collective efficacy relating to local norms and values;
and residents’ perceptions of crime and disorder (Friedrichs, Galster, & Musterd, 2003;
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Massey, 1996; Perri 6, 2007). This consensus lies at the heart of long-standing support for
mixed planning policies which seek to avoid ghettoisation (see Berube, 2005; or for a more
critical account Graham, Manley, Hiscock, Boyle, & Doherty, 2009). The logic is that a
rising tide of economic growth will lift all boats.
There is also evidence to corroborate Jennings and Stoker’s account of the political con-
sequences of Britain’s ‘geographies of opportunity’. They argue that individuals in thriving
cosmopolitan areas and ‘backwaters’ are likely to be equally pessimistic about politics, but
that they are likely to express their political discontent in distinct ways. The former are
more likely to engage in higher cost activities (such as protests), while the latter are
more likely to limit their activity to voting. This fits with existing research on political par-
ticipation in deprived areas. For example, Gordon et al. (2000) discover that from a list of
civic activities respondents have to choose from to indicate in which they engage them-
selves, only voting (in local and general elections) drew more than 1 in 3 respondents.
Nevertheless, the contemporary reality of how deprivation presents across the U.K. is
considerably more nuanced and varied than this broad narrative allows. Ethnographers
like Lisa Mckenzie (2017) write about working-class estates from a ‘community studies
based approach’. She compares a London estate with one in Nottingham, describing
how in London gentrification is squeezing long standing working-class residents out to
make way for ‘yuppies’. These residents’ feelings that they are living on a shrinking ‘reser-
vation’ chimes with our description of ‘nested deprivation’. We know that there are sig-
nificant pockets of this kind of deprivation even in areas of apparent affluence that
escape national attention, nowhere more so than in the rural and dispersed areas of
Southern England. Such areas are typically presented as affluent and affording their resi-
dents a high quality of life (Milbourne, 2010). Indeed, cultural constructions of rural life in
England in particular serve to ‘(re)produce and (re)negotiate arcadian and pastoral idylls
about rural life’, in doing so limiting even the recognition of the existence of poverty
(Cloke, Milbourne, & Thomas, 1997, p. 354). Area-based measures of deprivation or
socioeconomic status focus on measures of central tendency that obscure the heterogen-
eity of the population and finer-level deprivation (Farmer, Baird, & Iversen, 2001) –
including in rural villages and market towns in counties like Hampshire and Dorset.
This form of nested deprivationmatters not just because it complicates the essentialist nar-
rative of ‘haves’ versus ‘have-nots’, but because it suggests that different ‘geographies of
opportunity’ entail different experiences. We need to know whether these different experi-
ences have different consequences for political attitudes and participation.
Social Marginalisation
The alternative account of the ‘marginalised communities’ framing, associated with Ford
and Goodwin’s (2014) Revolt on the Right, represents recent political volatility as a form of
cultural backlash (see also Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017; Kaufmann & Harris, 2015). This
narrative posits that large swathes of the U.K. feel ‘left behind’ socially and culturally as
much as economically. The trouble here is not so much with the economic consequences
of market liberalisation and global trade, but the social consequences associated with these
policies, including the concentration of cultural capital in London, increasing social liber-
alism and rising levels of immigration. The ‘left behind’, therefore, are seen to be nostalgic
about the past, to be uncomfortable with social liberalism, and most of all to want stricter
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controls on immigration. The remedy, according to the narrative, is greater recognition of
and respect for this concentrated form of shared cultural anxiety.
Once again, this narrative accords with existing scholarship on deprivation and place.
Certainly, existing research shows that nostalgic feelings have been strongly associated
with areas that have experienced de-industrialisation and urban decline in the U.K.,
such as the valleys of South Wales described by Walkerdine (2010) or the West Midlands
where ‘living memories of de- industrialisation have translated into a feeling of the
“depressing present”’ (Popov & Price, 2013).
However, just as economic marginalisation is not divided neatly into haves and have-
nots, social and cultural marginalisation is better understood as a more nuanced phenom-
enon. Most obviously, while ‘Leave Land’ and ‘Remain Land’ represent headline-grabbing
heuristics, the reliance on labelling territories based on broad turnout data and relatively
small majorities in public opinion data disguises contemporary complexities of social
identity and cultural insecurity. Particularly crucial here is that pockets of nested depri-
vation tend to be at the pointy end of the social and cultural upheavals wrought by
market liberalisation and economic globalisation (van Ham & Manley, 2012). As such,
there is significant evidence to suggest that social and cultural marginalisation happens
within communities – including apparently affluent centres of cultural capital – as well
as between them. Moreover, we might expect deprived individuals to suffer from
weaker local networks and social cohesion or ‘place attachment’ within these more
affluent communities. In Britain especially, for instance, there is evidence that this geo-
graphically concentrated nostalgia can underpin solidarity, instilling a collective sense
of ‘us versus them’ within marginalised communities (see Atkinson & Kintrea, 2004;
Kearns & Parkinson, 2001). There are potentially important implications for how deprived
individuals in more affluent settings experience ‘place attachment’, and ultimately how
they might seek to exercise political voice, in a context of dispersal and isolation.
In sum, narrative devices like ‘Two Englands’ and the ‘Left Behind’ offer appealing
heuristics for understanding Britain’s emerging electoral battleground, but the reality of
place-based politics is more complex. There is significant economic and cultural margin-
alisation within, rather than just across, communities as a consequence of nested depri-
vation. The unresolved questions, which we seek to unpack, are how these alternative
experiences of economic and social marginalisation impact on political attitudes and beha-
viours, and on whether these findings might inform academic and political debate about
the impact of escalating inequality on politics in Britain.
Methods
In part, nested deprivation has been overlooked as a natural consequence of reliance on
methodological tools like the British Election Study (BES). It is simply not practical to
drill down to the level of detail required in order to understand the effects of nested depri-
vation in affluent areas like the South of England using a national survey of this sort. In this
project, we adopted a qualitative approach that can expose more fine-grained levels of
detail. O’Loughlin (2018) has bemoaned an expanding divide between political scientists,
who favour quantitative operationalisations of objective ‘space’, and geographers who tend
to honour ‘place’, and favour less positivist approaches that are more sceptical of official
boundaries. In a recent study that aims to take the difference between the concepts more
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seriously, Adler andAnsell (2020) show using house price data strong evidence for effects of
‘space’ onBrexit at both the individual and aggregate level. Their analysis uncovers a ‘fractal’
pattern with regard to space, showing that higher house prices and price-growth is associ-
atedwith voting to remain in theEU– afinding that is reproduced andoften strengthened in
smaller spatial units of analysis. But we still do not know if these trends are reflected in the
authentic voice of people in deprived communities, speaking to their own self-understand-
ing of place. In a further effort to overcome divides and fill a significant gap in the literature,
our work systematically selects cases according to spatial criteria and then extracts qualitat-
ive data throughfieldworkwith place inmind. The approach allows us to identify anymean-
ingful variation in place at these more local levels. Here, we outline our approach to case
selection and data collection and analysis.
Case Selection
Some of the cases we select are examples of relatively larger areas suffering deprivation
nested within the more affluent South, but others represent small neighbourhoods them-
selves nested within affluent towns or hinterlands. We compare these different types of
nested deprivation to understand the consequences of that variation on individuals and
families as they struggle to make ends meet. Investigations of deprivation and its effects
tend to concentrate on deprived areas and seek general lessons about the differences
between those areas and the U.K. average. Those studies, typically of declining industrial
towns, or coastal seaside resorts, do not necessarily shed light on the deprivation that exists
in the countryside and small towns. In addition, they do not explore whether there are
regional variations to the experience of poverty. We lack any understanding as to
whether the experience is different in areas that are seen as wealthy or even ‘idyllic’
places to visit and live. Within some of the most affluent areas of the south, there are indi-
viduals experiencing economic hardship that can be overlooked when comparing aggre-
gate data on wealth and prosperity.
We used quantitative techniques in order to systematically select Lower Super Output
Areas (LSOAs)2 across Hampshire and Dorset that match certain criteria regarding their
geographical context and their relative levels of deprivation. The table below demonstrates
the criteria for case selection allowing comparison of urbanity/rurality and levels of depri-
vation. The selection criteria for each category are then explained.
Relatively Deprived Not Deprived
A. Inner City Case A1 Case A2
B. Suburban Case B1 Case B2
C. Town Fringe Case C1 Case C2
D. Rural dispersed Case D1 Case D2
Creating the Geographical Classification
The geographical classifications above (A–D) are not used by the Office for National Stat-
istics (ONS 2017) to classify LSOAs. Instead, they utilise a 2011 measure that, classifies
LSOAs as either City and Town, Rural Town and Fringe and Rural village and dispersed
(E1) based on the construction of a ‘density profile’ for each hectare (100 m x 100 m)
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cell of the United Kingdom (Bibby & Brindley, 2013).3 We have recoded this data from
these three categories into the four categories (A-D) above in the following way to
better reflect the different categories of neighbourhood as they present along the central
southern coast where rurality is less pronounced than in other parts of the U.K.:
Inner City: LSOAs that have the ONS classification of City and Town and are located
less than 5 km from any city centre in Hampshire or Dorset with a population of 100,000
or greater.
Suburban: LSOAs with the classification of City and Town or Rural Town and Fringe
but are located between 5 and 15 km from any city in Hampshire and Dorset with a popu-
lation of 100,000 or greater.
Market Town/Fringe: LSOAS that have the classification Rural Town and Fringe that
are not located between 5 and 15 km from any city in Hampshire and Dorset with a popu-
lation of 100,000 or greater.
Rural Dispersed: LSOAs that have the classification Rural village and dispersed.
We used ArcGIS to measure the distance from each LSOA to the nearest large cities
(Southampton, Portsmouth, Bournemouth, Basingstoke, Poole) The distance 5–15 km
is our proximate measure of whether a suburb is urban, with significant connections to
a larger urban city. For example, in this definition, most areas in the Eastleigh local auth-
ority are classified as a suburb of Southampton.
Definitions of Deprivation
After recoding the LSOAs in Hampshire and Dorset, we had to determine their relative
levels of deprivation. The ONS data ranks every LSOA in the country on an Index of Mul-
tiple Deprivation (IMD). It allocates each LSOA to a decile, reflecting their position in the
overall distribution of deprivation. For example, LSOAs that have an IMD decile ranking
of 1 are in the top 10%most deprived LSOAs nationally. Those LSOAs with an IMD decile
ranking of 10 are in the bottom 10%. We used the following method to classify LSOAs as
Deprived and Not Deprived:
Deprived: Any LSOAs that has an IMD decile of between 1 and 3. These LSOAs are in
the top 30% most deprived nationally.
Not Deprived: Any LSOAs that has an IMD decile of between 8 and 10. These LSOAs
are in the 30% least deprived LSOAs nationally.
From this classification system, we attained a subset of the dataset representing each
category from A1 to D2. From there, using a randomisation technique performed with
Microsoft Excel, we randomly selected five potential case studies from those that fell in
each category. We then made inquiries as to the viability of each potential case study in
terms of costs and access for recruitment of participants, and fit with the overall aims
of the project. Where potential cases were deemed equally viable a final randomisation
procedure was used to select the case. For the D1 category of rural dispersed and relatively
deprived only one location was attained. This is due to the relatively low levels of multiple
deprivation across rural areas in Hampshire and Dorset. Therefore we made every effort to
include that case to represent the D1 category.
The table below reveals the outcome of the case selection. The next section introduces
the study sites in more detail.
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1. Relatively Deprived 2. Not Deprived
A. Inner City Central Fratton (Portsmouth) East Moordown (Bournemouth)
B. Suburban Leigh Park East (Havant) Catisfield (Fareham)
C. Market Town / Fringe West Portland (Weymouth and Portland area) North Alresford (Winchester area)
D. Rural dispersed Chale Green (Isle of Wight) West Wellow North (Test Valley)
Pen Portraits: Rural and Market Town LSOAs.4
Chale Green, Isle of Wight
Chale Green is the northern settlement of the dispersed
rural village of Chale, halfway between Newport and
Ventnor. The area is a thoroughfare for tourists visiting
Blackgang Chine in the summer. Deprivation centres
around the large Spanners Close social housing estate.
Developed in the late 1970s, the estate was described to
us by locals as a planning ‘disaster’ that, in relocating and
concentrating ‘problem families’ from across the Island in
a rural area poorly served by transport links and
amenities, exacerbated social problems and generated
considerable antipathy between the old village (Chale)
and the newcomers (Chale Green). The consensus is that
the problems associated with this planning move have
mellowed over time, but Spanners Close retains
something of an aesthetic and social disconnection from
the surrounding area. It is the deprived rural LSOA in the
Hampshire and Dorset area according to our selection
criteria.
West Wellow, Hampshire
Wellow is a wealthy rural village to the west of Romsey, near
the Hampshire-Wiltshire boundary. The area has
traditionally been home to wealthy retirees and provided
seasonal work in agriculture. In recent times, it has also
become an area popular with commuters to London and
Southampton. Deprivation here centres around the
Gurnays Mead social housing estate, which is populated
by a mix of older people and families. Notable in particular
is a sizeable Irish Traveller community within the estate
(and with links to temporary settlements nearby). Social
housing in Gurnays Mead is in high demand, and, with a
proportion of houses already transferred into private
hands, there is a strong perception locally that these
properties are being earmarked for private sale. These
perceptions feed distrust or concern for official
institutions among the local population – which made
recruitment in this area especially challenging for the
research team.
Portland, Dorset
Portland is a small town on an isolated peninsula southwest
of Weymouth. It is home to a mix of retirees, working age
people and families. Deprivation in this area centres
around a couple of large social housing estates developed
in the 1960s built to house naval and quarry workers. As
with Chale Green above, the predictable outcome of this
planning decision to build social housing in a remote and
sparsely populated area generated antipathy in the wider
community, and Portland subsequently developed a
reputation as a ‘rough’ area. Our participants reflected
that it retains this to some extent, describing one part of a
neighbouring estate as ‘Beirut’ and referencing ongoing
social and health issues related to drug supply and use in
the community. Nevertheless, Portland’s geographical
remoteness, coupled with its close proximity to attractive
coastline, give it an ‘island’ feel, reflected in a friendly and
laid back local culture.
North Alresford, Hampshire
Alresford is a pretty market town near Winchester. The town
is a visibly wealthy one that conforms to common
stereotypes about Hampshire. It is home to many
professionals commuting to London or elsewhere, and
many wealthy retirees. The pockets of deprivation here
are small and are clustered around condensed areas of
social housing and ex-social housing. These are located
nearby leafy streets lined with large ‘mansions’. The
town’s amenities represent the idyllic view of life in a
market town, largely catering to the needs of the upper
middle class and older residents. Many of our participants,
especially younger people, joked about Alresford being in
a ‘timewarp’ – with little recognition of diversity and old-
fashioned stigmas attached to the minority of residents
who remain economically and socially vulnerable.
Pen Portraits: Suburban and Inner City LSOAs.
Leigh Park, Hampshire
Leigh Park is a large suburb north of Havant, built in the
post-war era by Portsmouth County Council to house
displaced residents from the Portsmouth area. Our
research concentrated on the area to the North-West of
the Park Parade shops. The area has a varied demographic
profile with a mix of young families and pensioners. Many
of the residents we spoke to are attending food banks.
Fareham (Highlands), Hampshire
The town of Fareham lies to the north-west of Portsmouth
city. The population has expanded rapidly in the area
since the 1960s as part of housing development along the
southeast Hampshire coast stretching between the two
major cities. Many of the residents are commuters and
Fareham boasts the highest density of car registration in
the U.K. Our research concentrated on the Highlands area
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They expressed a nostalgia for a time when the estate was
more ‘well looked after’ and many mentioned the closing
down of shops in Park Parade. There is a feeling that the
area is a little cut off from the rest of the urban sprawl
stretching along the coast. One young teenager
mentioned his excitement at having visited the beach
recently for the first time ever despite living only some 10
miles away.
in the north-east suburbs. The estate is primarily made up
of council houses with older tenants and families.
Recently many of the properties have been purchased by
private landlords and turned into houses of multiple
occupation (HMO)s. In addition to this, property
developers have built new houses on the outskirts of the
estate where small council estates and clusters of lower
grade housing are hidden behind avenues lined with
trees and larger detached houses.
Portsmouth (Fratton), Hampshire
Fratton is a large area of post-industrial residential terraced
housing in the city of Portsmouth. Our respondents, some
of whom had lived in the area for many decades spoke of
nostalgia for the past and a feeling that the area had
changed beyond recognition, particularly highlighting the
replacement of local shops by large supermarkets and
many betting shops, as well as HMOs replacing family
homes. Homelessness was identified as a major issue in
the area by almost all respondents. Many mentioned the
change from a time when everyone’s door was open to a
current climate where many homeless camp out in tents
on the streets. Residents in Fratton were positive about
the many opportunities for entertainment and ‘liveliness’
of living in a city close to the water. The proximity to
Southsea, a more affluent area by the sea was also
highlighted by many interviewees.
Bournemouth (Moordown), Dorset
The East Moordown area of Bournemouth is on the Western
side of the Charminster road and does not include the
shopping centre of Moordown itself. Therefore it does not
have a clear heart or focal point but consists of largely
residential streets of detached and semi-detached owner
occupied houses on gently sloping streets. There are a
variety of occupants, from elderly to students. It has good
transport links to all parts of the city, from Castlepoint
shopping centre to beaches. However it does not have
many green spaces. Most residents say it lacks a
community feel even among long term residents. The
most deprived part nests at the edge of the area, in a
small housing estate consisting of low rise and terraced
properties, many of which are now privately rented.
Data Collection and Analysis
The participants we hoped to speak to are notoriously ‘hard to reach’ in social science
research (see Bonevski et al., 2014) – a fact that made the research particularly timely
and important, but which obviously presents ethical and practical challenges in the
field. As a consequence, the research team put a lot of collective energy into recruitment.
We made multiple site visits to each setting, approached local community leaders, con-
tacted food banks, posted on community Facebook pages, dropped flyers, posted letters,
and knocked on doors. We also drew on relationships with initial research participants
to ‘snowball’ through neighbourhood networks (see Wagenaar, 2011). This range of
recruitment strategies enabled us to get a diverse sample, with variation in age, ethnicity
and gender across the overall sample and across most individual sites as well. Importantly,
this recruitment approach meant the people we spoke to were not habituated to partici-
pating in mass surveys or other forms of research; it was a new experience for all of
them. Some told us they participated out of curiosity. Some told us they participated
because they felt passionate about their community. Some told us they participated to
get the small honorarium. This diversity – in demographic and motivational terms –
ensures that we have captured a rich variety of experiences. Our sample, therefore, pro-
vides the basis for ‘plausible conjecture’ (see Rhodes, 2014)5 – we have confidence that
the patterns we have found in the responses and reflections of participants offer plausible
and authentic accounts of nested deprivation on the South Coast.
Interviews were semi-structured, ranging in length from around 25 min to two hours.
Most interviews were one on one, but a small handful were with couples, siblings, friends
or multiple generations of the same family. Interviews were generally conducted in
people’s homes, or in local spots such as cafes or meeting halls. The intimacy of these
encounters meant we could experience and sense-check for ourselves some of the
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claims of our participants – notably around public transport, housing arrangements, and
local amenities and shopping precincts (see discussion in Boswell et al., 2018). We fol-
lowed up the initial round of interviews with focus groups – 6 in total – which enabled
us to elicit rich reflections on emerging themes. Participants were paid a small honorarium
for their participation, in light of the fact they were giving up their time. We were also
aware that participants were consenting to sharing with us sometimes challenging or har-
rowing experiences. We have endeavoured to be sensitive to their feelings while still
seeking to give authentic voice to the lived experience of nested deprivation.
The interview, focus group, and field note data was coded in a process of abduction
common to richly qualitative research (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013). Abduction
entails moving between the findings emerging in the empirical data and key themes emer-
ging through critical engagement with the literature. As is typical of this sort of research –
particularly when the fieldwork has been undertaken by a multi-member team – it was not
a hydraulic, stepwise process, but more iterative, co-productive and creative. We outline
that process below.
The research team met at multiple stages – before, during and after the intensive
fieldwork phase of the research – to discuss anticipated themes from the relevant academic
literatures and emergent themes from field visits and initial interviews. Key themes from
the interviews and field notes were then collated and used to prompt a subsequent round
of focus groups, where participants were given a chance to reflect on, challenge and elab-
orate on initial impressions. Based on these collective reflections, Boswell and Ryan manu-
ally coded the data independently in the first instance, and merged these initial insights for
a project report and launch (see Boswell et al., 2018). This initial analysis was followed by a
more methodical coding process, using Nvivo software. We built on and extended this
‘first cut’, incorporating reflections by the research team and discussions with end users
at the report launch event.
Ethical considerations were important not only in data generation and access but also
in analysis and writing-up as well. The study was examined and approved by the Univer-
sity of Southampton Faculty of Social, Human and Mathematical Sciences Ethics Board,
and one key condition of its approval was that individual participants would remain anon-
ymous. However, the communities we drill down into are small and intimate. We think an
authentic account of the specific communities is important to the analysis and argument.
So, we have done our best to anonymise all quotes and vignettes and altered some contex-
tual detail. In this way, we can represent authentic local voices in these specific commu-
nities while still preserving the anonymity of individual participants.
Analysis
As we might expect, there is significant variation in perception both within and across
each of the eight neighbourhoods in our study. We encountered stories of connectedness
and isolation, anxiety and contentment, empowerment and disaffection, optimism and
pessimism, all in different shades across each site. That said, certain trends or patterns
in the responses of our participants emerge. In this analysis, we connect these patterns
to the three key elements of nested deprivation introduced in the literature review:
namely economic marginalisation, social marginalisation, and the political consequences
of both.
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Economic Marginalisation
There is concern about ‘economic stagnation’ across the more deprived settings, especially
in the more densely populated neighbourhoods. Leigh Park provides perhaps the most
obvious example. Participants here commented at length on the ‘drab’ High Street domi-
nated by betting shops, payday lenders, empty lots and boarded up shops, the lack of
employment opportunities, and the absence of social mobility. Yet this stagnation or
decline is made all the more stark by the area’s proximity to areas of relative affluence,
including landscaped parkland. One participant explained:
I think this area reflects struggle, and I think that shows in the boarded up shops. Even to the
point of the amount of pound shops we’ve got; there are quite a few of those in Park Parade.
It’s not the biggest shopping precinct… I love Staunton Country Park, I think it’s lovely. I
think it’s great that it’s right on our doorstep. And it is massively different; it’s like a
different world. It’s green. Do you know what I mean, without sounding silly?
Participants in more rural and dispersed areas of deprivation, like Portland and Chale
Green, emphasised even more strongly a sense of economic disconnect from a broader
context of affluence. Residents spoke about both as being ‘islands’ of deprivation within
the islands themselves, cut off from the local economy which revolves around wealthy
retirees or tourists. Chale Green residents concentrated their ire on the local shop – the
only one within several miles – which caters for the wealthy retirees in the broader
village of Chale and for tourists visiting the island. One participant joked:
It’s so expensive and it’s like, they’re not – they use a lot of basic stuff, fair enough but then
have a price to match. So there was some – I wanted a bubble bath the other day, I was 2p
shorter than £4. And I thought for £4 I want the little fairies coming out and dabbing my face
with a little flannel!
This immediate or in-your-face sense of economic marginalisation came across stron-
ger still among those deprived but living in less deprived areas. In the urban and suburban
contexts of Bournemouth and Fareham, the central concern was around affordability and
security of housing. One participant explained:
Just with the money you get for what you’ve got to buy, especially with Bournemouth more
expensive to live in, it’s just not enough money… I’m in the middle of getting my bank, and I
tried telling themmy income/expenditure, and they couldn’t even take a payment plan offme
because my expenditure exceeded my income.
Interestingly, employment opportunities and strong public services and amenities
afforded by the prosperous urban economy were seen as insufficient compensation for
this housing ‘trap’. One participant reflected:
I work in London a fair amount and you can – from Bournemouth Station into Waterloo
takes two hours, so it is a commutable place, which keeps the – again pushes the prices
up. It’s all one of those things where it – it seems like we’re living in an affluent area but
it’s all relative, it’s not – it’s not like we can sell up and be in the money… Relocating any-
where would be difficult, especially after working for somewhere for so long and progressing
through the ranks and what have you.
Concerns about economic ‘entrapment’ in areas of expensive housing were also appar-
ent in more sparsely populated settings of nested deprivation, in Alresford and Wellow.
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For example, all of those reliant on social housing in Wellow that we spoke to expressed
deep concern about the high (and increasing) value of the properties they lived in. But in
more dispersed areas we also uncovered a much broader sense of marginalisation from the
local economy. The most poignant example was Alresford. In contrast to Leigh Park’s
‘drab’ shopping precinct, the High Street here was a source of resentment and alienation
because it is ‘way up there for the rich’ – it is stocked with boutique shops in which these
individuals are unwelcome, either as potential employees or as customers. Discussion in a
focus group here lingered on the topic:
P1: Well, yeah, the shopping, there are some nice clothes shops in Alresford.
P2: Yeah, if you’ve got loads of money.
P1: But it’s way out of my league.
P3: It’s silly. It’s £400 for handbags.
P2: £400 for a handbag, that’s in Alresford!
This stark sense of marginalisation extends from the High Street through the residential
areas, as one interviewee surmised:
There’s quite a strong sense of wealth here and you can see the difference here, do you know
what I’m saying? You’ve got a comparison there and it’s clear, the wealth and like myself on
the benefits side of life. I don’t know how people afford to do all these things but they do…
it’s when you see these big houses, I go by and I peer in like, and I think to myself and think
bloody hell, how could they do it? And I think, oh you’d get lost in there and they’re after
Bedroom Tax from me for this small, tiny house.
In sum, drilling down reveals that the ‘geography of opportunity’ in the U.K. has not
produced a neat division of winners and losers, and that those living in a context of
nested deprivation perceive themselves to be marginalised from their local economy in
fundamental, everyday ways. They feel economically entrapped in affluent communities
where everything – the cost of housing, even the target market at the local shopping pre-
cinct – feels designed for someone else. In other words, the rising tide does not lift all boats;
it can leave some people to drown. We will return to this point in discussing the conse-
quences for political participation.
Social Marginalisation
In more deprived settings, participants expressed a clearer sense of belonging to a
marginalised group, expressing a sense of ‘us versus them’. This occasionally found
expression in the sort of cultural anxiety at the heart of the Left Behind thesis, par-
ticularly among older participants. In more densely populated sites, some of these
participants spoke with great nostalgia about the post-War Britain of their childhood,
and relayed concerns about immigration as a threat to community cohesion. Take, for
example, this exchange from a group interview with three friends in their 60s in
Fratton:
P1: It’s not as friendly. You’ve really got no neighbours who talk to you. It’s not as nice. I’d
sooner go back to the 50s and 60s.
P2: Well, I live in [X] Road. I’ve lived there 23 years and it’s changed massively. It’s not
very friendly now. A lot of little bedsits and a lot of immigration. In my road it’s a
very, very, very mixed community so there’s not really a lot of interaction with
other people. They don’t want to know.
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Another man in his 40s in Fratton expressed similar views, explaining his dislike for the
local shopping precinct:
I don’t like how it’s all a bit, a bit too sort of multi-cultural, you know what I mean? I know we
said this before earlier, it’s all a bit sort of foreign. I hate to say it, I hate to sound like a racist
or anything, I don’t mean to be but it’s – I just don’t like how it is a bit like that. It’s just a bit
too much.
Yet it is striking that these ideas were not more prominent in the context of over 40
semi-structured interviews and 6 semi-structured focus groups with over 60 people.6
We found participants were more likely to be neutral (or occasionally even positive)
about immigration than they were to express xenophobic attitudes. Indeed, a subsequent
focus group interaction in Fratton put anti-immigration views in perspective:
The Polish community down here, he’s made a lot of friends, and one of the guys was
working illegally because he had three children and no visa and no work permit, nothing,
and he had to provide for his children, and so he was working and he’s been caught three
times working, and he’s said, ‘You’ve given me no choice. How am I supposed to provide
for my children if you don’t give me my work permit?’ Now he has been let off. I don’t
know the ins and outs but I know that, ‘Okay, we get you,’ but he’s been here for 12 years
and he still hasn’t got a work visa. And then they moan that they take money off the state.
He doesn’t take money off the state and he doesn’t want to skive, but I know ones that do
and I know ones that should be going home because they are doing it just to sit down and
do nothing. But the majority of them want to work, and do work, some of them, illegally,
because they haven’t given them a choice, and I think that’s what’s sad.
Instead, in our findings, the greater sense of ‘us versus them’ in deprived settings
reflected a more old-fashioned socio-economic cleavage. Typically surrounded by
affluent and Conservative-dominated areas, residents of our more deprived neighbour-
hoods expressed a sense of community solidarity based on traditional class ties. We saw
this to some extent in more densely populated areas but more so still in the sparsely popu-
lated ‘islands’ of Portland and Chale Green. One Portland respondent explained:
It’s Portland Whispers, that’s what they say it is; it’s like one big family up here so everyone
knows everyone.
Chale Green residents spoke of a similar phenomenon – something all the starker here
for its distinction from the surrounding older village of Chale:
It’s like this is Chale Green, but if you go just about five minutes down the road then it goes to
Chale [said mockingly in ‘posh’ voice]… It makes you feel ostracised, because you’re not part
of – It’s Chale, and it shouldn’t be Chale Green and Chale.
In our cases of more affluent neighbourhoods this sense of community solidarity
among smaller nests of poverty was almost entirely absent. One person in Wellow
bemoaned the loss of community with the rise of economic development:
Yes, this used to be a lovely village. There’s lots of housing estates that have been built since I
was a little girl… I suppose these land owners need to make money and that’s why all the
houses have gone up. It’s probably good for the village I suppose but you can go down to
the local shop and not know anybody and many years ago you would know everybody… .
So I don’t really know anyone round here now. I wouldn’t even know their names.
A participant in Alresford expressed a similar sentiment:
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It’s just how society’s come. I remember when I was a kid people didn’t lock their doors.
You’d be in and out of each other’s houses all day, do you know what I mean? Kids
would play in the street and nobody would think anything of it, you can’t do none of that
these days.
An immigrant who had recently arrived in Fareham put it this way:
I mean you know the neighbourhood, everybody is busy with their life. You won’t even see
your neighbours – once in a month you probably see them outside or passing through. It’s no
[sense of] social or community.
In the generally more affluent urban areas especially, participants attributed the lack of
community not to immigration but to a consequence of economic growth and inequality.
Of particular concern in settings like Fareham and Bournemouth (and also expressed to a
lesser extent in Fratton and Leigh Park) was the incremental shift in the rental market
from family homes to houses of multiple occupancy:
The houses that go up for sale are being grabbed up by landlords and turned into multi-occu-
pancy houses, such as next door.… I think if every house that comes up for sale is grabbed up
by this multi-house, whatever it’s called, it will turn it into a ghetto instead of a proper com-
munity with families. That’s how I feel.
Participants in settings of nested deprivation also spoke of the stigma associated with
living in, for example, the only pocket of social housing in a ‘nice’ area. We uncovered
these sentiments even in the ‘nice little bubble’ of Wellow, where for example one partici-
pant frequently referenced the shame of being from ‘Gurnays Mead’. But the sense of
stigma intensified in more densely populated settings. For example, one young woman
we spoke to in Bournemouth articulated this stigma at length:
I don’t know, you think a council house and you probably think the worst of society and I’m
not that person, I’m not like that. And although I grew up in it, I’m trying to do everything I
can to be the complete opposite, and sometimes I do feel a bit ashamed, and I know that’s
wrong. And I’m not ashamed of my family and it’s nobody’s fault, it’s not my mum’s
fault, but I do feel quite ashamed sometimes so I try to avoid that and I won’t tell people I
live in a council house.
In sum, we see only a little evidence of inequality in the South Coast creating a Left
Behind agitated by cultural anxiety about social liberalism and immigration. Remember-
ing that we talked specifically to more deprived residents in all cases, what evidence we
find of ‘left behind’ tends to be concentrated in urban and more extensively deprived
areas. We find more evidence in rural deprived areas in this affluent region of old-
fashioned class cleavages. Moreover, we find in areas of smaller nested deprivation of a
few houses or flats within larger affluent neighbourhoods, especially in more densely
populated areas, our participants expressed a weak or non-existent sense of community
solidarity or place attachment at all. The experience of deprivation nested within
affluent regions has social consequences, but those consequences vary on the dispersion
and concentrations of that deprivation in ways that condition political expression.
Political Consequences
The political consequences of this nuanced ‘geography of opportunity’ require careful
unpacking. On the surface, the overwhelming response from participants across our
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sample to questions about politics bore striking similarities – they were uniformly negative
in their assessment of how politics operates. Many simply laughed off our questions about
politics altogether. Digging a little deeper, however, reveals an important qualitative differ-
ence across our range of settings.
In more deprived and densely populated settings, participants were more likely to
express anger about local and national politics. For some, these perceptions put them
off participating in politics altogether. In Fratton, for instance, one participant explained:
I don’t take any notice of them because they’re all the same. They’re big with promises and
then they never deliver. All the promises, no matter what, Conservative, Labour, or whoever,
in all my years, they’ve never delivered what they’ve promised, so I don’t even vote.
Yet for others it could be a mobilising experience. One of our participants, for example,
related to us that the cutting of funding for the SureStart centre which had been a crucial
source of support for her had spurred her and her partner to become involved in local
party politics. We encountered similar stories in Leigh Park – in fact, one set of friends
we interviewed told us they had actually met at a protest in Westminster the year
before. But the sentiment was articulated clearest by another participant there:
So there’s a real strong community sense of, we are in this together, but not in that pat way
that the Tories did it a few years ago, you know what I mean? Do you remember when they
tried to sell us the Big Society, you know what I mean? We’re going to take away all the
funding of all the projects that we should be doing and leave it up to you guys because
you guys are the Big Society, you know what I mean?
However, in more affluent and dispersed settings, we encountered a more uniform
sense of fatalism about even the potential for political efficacy. Politics, for most of
these participants, was just another means by which they felt marginalised from their
communities.
For some, this pessimism was based on direct personal experience. One participant in
Bournemouth, for instance, explained how her attempts to contact the local MP about the
impact of the high cost of living had felt a ‘waste of time’:
I don’t have a nice car – I don’t have a car, you know, or anything like that because we just
can’t – we can’t even afford to learn how to drive down here. It is so bad and I’ve even spoken
to our local MP. He’s gone, ‘Well I can’t afford to live down here.’ And it’s like, ‘Yeah, but you
earn £82,000 a year and own two houses, that’s why you can’t afford to live down here.’ You
know, I don’t own a house and he’s just, ‘Oh but that’s not my problem.’And we’re like, ‘Well
it’s mine.’
Likewise, in Chale Green, for example – a concentrated setting of deprivation nested
within a rural area of relative affluence – many participants spoke of their anger at the
recent closure of their local school, and the process by which it occurred. The situation
had momentarily mobilised collective action within the area as people fought to keep
the school open, but that sense of agency had dissipated in the face of the disappointing
(lack of) response from the local council. The experience left residents feeling powerless, as
one explained:
I think the council thought, ‘Well, why should these children from low-income backgrounds,
why should they have-?’ because they were talking about costs and howmuch more it costs to
educate a child in a village school, and how, in comparison to a school in the town with bigger
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classes, it’s much more efficient financially. And it was almost as if they thought, ‘Well, why
should children from that sort to background be eligible for having that sort of one-to-one or
that extra?’
Most often in areas of nested deprivation this pessimism was simply common sense,
expressed often in a gallows humour reflecting a lack of collective agency. This sentiment,
and its roots in the local ‘geography of opportunity’, was made clearest in an Alresford
focus group, where participants made pointed reference to local politics being dominated
by ‘Tories from Eaton’:
I think they let you think – and this is my personal opinion – I think they let you think we can
have a say in things, but, actually, when it comes down to it, they decide what’s what, at the
end of the day.
In sum, in deprived settings (especially in urban and suburban areas), we find some evi-
dence of the sort of grievance politics at the heart of accounts of the ‘Two Englands’ and
‘Left Behind’, albeit mobilised by different factors (largely against incumbent Conservative
governments at national and local level) and in different ways (entailing direct action and
not just voting) than these accounts would suggest. More importantly, though, we encoun-
ter a strong sense of fatalism and political inefficacy in more deprived (especially market
town and rural) settings where low income residents feel they have no genuine voice. Even
where political mobilisation at small scales did occur, it met with a lack of response. We
think this is partly because this deprived constituency is geographically dispersed in ato-
mised pockets across an affluent area like the south coast. Therefore, there is no easy path
for mobilisation to occur and for the advocacy and representation at the heart of pluralist
models of politics to take hold. We have shown that deprivation manifests differently but
with some consistency in small pockets nested within largely affluent geographical consti-
tuencies. Smaller deprived communities already suffer from low political and social capital,
reducing mobilisation of political concerns into collective action and response. Yet their
dispersion across areas where many fellow citizens experience completely different lives
creates a double burden in their attempts to be meaningfully represented in pluralist poli-
tics. Even where we saw appetite and some action for political mobilisation, small commu-
nities were unable to find potential coalitions and the political system did not respond. Up
to now the left-behind, two England, and city-towns theses have not accounted for these
features of nested deprivation. Where deprivation is dispersed and then nested within
mostly affluent constituencies it does not allow for the political mobilisation among com-
munities of interest that is a necessary condition for pluralist representative democracy.
Conclusion
Our research into nested deprivation on the South Coast should give significant pause to
the high profile debate – both academic and political – about the political geography of
inequality and especially the new ‘place-based politics’ of the U.K. We have shown that
sweeping narratives about ‘Two Englands’ and the ‘Left Behind’, which divide the
country neatly into haves and have-nots of market liberalisation and globalisation, are
much too simplistic. There is significant deprivation, and acute inequality, in apparently
affluent areas, including the South of England. We propose the term ‘nested deprivation’
enter the lexicon to identify communities that marginalise as distinct from marginalised
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communities. In settings of greater affluence, we find that residents feel marginalised from
their economy, marginalised from the social fabric of the community, and ultimately mar-
ginalised from any means of realising or expressing political voice. Of course, the findings
based on an intensive study of 8 neighbourhoods and just over 60 individuals can only be
one stone, and far from the final word, in the contemporary debate about inequality, place
and politics. While recent reports point to evidence of the spread of nested deprivation as a
phenomenon (e.g. MHLG, 2019), whether the political practices we find (or do not) are as
widespread will require some further corroboration. Nevertheless, we think that the impli-
cations of this analysis are especially important for two reasons.
First, the advantage of the rich, in-depth qualitative research we have undertaken across
different settings is that it adds greater depth and nuance to contemporary understanding
of how inequality, place and politics interact. Unlike the grand narratives that underpin the
Left Behind thesis, we show that being a ‘loser’ from market liberalisation and globalisa-
tion does not lead inexorably to a sense of cultural anxiety, even in a region where immi-
grants are a relatively high proportion of the population. For our South Coast participants,
anxiety, alienation and anger are much more likely to be directed at Government, at aus-
terity, and at the affluence that surrounds them. Understanding the new ‘place-based poli-
tics’ of the U.K. will require further and deeper investigation across different contexts of
deprivation.
Second, the findings have more immediate consequences politically. They suggest that
new political grand narratives based on assumptions about the Left Behind and Two Eng-
lands will fail if they alone are used to explain, campaign for, and underpin allocation of
political resources. The risk lies in efforts to imagine and contest a new map of electoral
battlegrounds on the basis of simplistic beliefs about essential priorities and preferences
along any North–South or city-town divide. We worry that these trends may only serve
to further alienate the Never Acknowledged in areas of nested deprivation who feel mar-
ginalised and disenfranchised already.
Notes
1. To be clear, Jennings and Stoker (2019) also acknowledge the importance of cultural beliefs in
individuals’ attitudes and behaviours. The distinction with the alternative Left Behind narrative
is that these beliefs are driven by economic context, in particular nostalgia for a prosperous past.
2. Output areas are the smallest units of census reporting data in the U.K.. Lower Super Output
areas consist of 4–6 adjacent output areas and have a mean population of 1500.
3. We used the latest available release of indices of multiple deprivation (2015) available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015.
4. Portraits draw heavily on a similar presentation in Boswel et al. (2018).
5. Rhodes explains that ‘plausible conjecture’ differs from generalizable inference – the claim is
not that our findings speak across time and space, but that there is reason to think they may
resonate beyond the boundaries of our empirical study.
6. Note that despite changing attitudes to immigration overall in the British population, recent
survey evidence suggests that little has shifted within low income populations (Ford & Lym-
peropoulou, 2017).
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